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6.1 Introduction 
In the ISOLDE facility, radioactive isotopes are produced by proton bombardment of a thick target. 
The products are ionized, accelerated to an energy E = 60 keV, mass-separated and transported to 
experimental stations. 
At present, the production target is bombarded by protons with E = 1.4 GeV. The beam is 
extracted from the PSB in pulses, each containing up to 3 × 1013 protons. The PSB can deliver one 
pulse every 1.2 seconds, half of which is dedicated to filling the Proton Synchrotron (PS). The average 
proton beam current on the target is therefore 2.0 μA at the energy of 1.4 GeV, resulting in an average 
power dissipation of 2.8 kW in the target and on the following beam dump.  
A recent proposal from the ISOLDE Group envisages an increase of the average particle current 
to 10 μA, partly by making use of a faster cycling rate of the PSB, but mostly through the availability 
of higher currents of low-energy protons from a potential new linear accelerator, Linac 4. We 
highlight the different radiation protection issues resulting from the increased particle current in the 
projected facility, which is called High Intensity and Energy (HIE) ISOLDE.  
In Section 6.2, the shielding of the target area with respect to the experimental area and to the 
zones accessible to the public around the facility against stray radiation from the target is described. 
Section 6.3 deals with gaseous and aqueous releases from ISOLDE into the environment. Section 6.4 
assesses the activation of the targets and the target area and the resulting radiation dose to personnel. 
Section 6.5 addresses protection against radioactive contamination. Sections 6.6 and 6.7 deal with the 
necessary construction improvements in the target and experimental area, respectively. Section 6.8 
reviews the situation regarding radioactive waste from ISOLDE.  
The aim of this report is to point to the areas where the present provisions for radiation 
protection are insufficient for operation of HIE-ISOLDE and where investment in technical solutions 
and manpower are required. The report is partly based on a Technical Note from the year 2000 [1], 
which came to similar conclusions. 
6.2 Shielding of the target area 
The purpose of the shielding around the target area is to protect members of the public outside the 
facility and personnel working within the facility from stray radiation. It is designed so that the dose 
limits applicable to these groups cannot be exceeded under normal operating conditions and in case of 
accidents with higher dose rates than normal. 
The shielding must guarantee that the dose rate in spaces accessible to the public does not 
exceed 0.5 μSv h–1, or 2.5 μSv h–1 in places without permanent occupancy (parking spaces, corridors, 
staircases, toilets). In a supervised radiation area1, such as the ISOLDE experimental area, the ambient 
dose equivalent rate is limited to 3 μSv h–1 at workplaces and to 10 μSv h–1 at places which are not 
permanently occupied, such as passageways or staircases. Only locally, at positions inaccessible to 
personnel, can higher values be tolerated. 
Line-of-sight shielding models [2] give a first, conservative estimate of expected dose 
equivalent H from the collision of high-energy protons with matter behind a shielding. Such models 
                                                     
1 In the next revision of Safety Code F, Protection against Ionising Radiation, the naming of designated radiation 
areas follows the conventions in France and other EU countries. The characteristics of the ‘supervised area’ 
correspond largely to those of the currently defined ‘simple controlled radiation area’. 
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are based on a source term depending on proton beam energy and angle of radiation incidence 
H0(E, θ), a 1/r2 geometrical attenuation with total distance r and an exponential taking into account the 
radiation attenuation in a composite shield employing n different materials with thickness di and 












1),(),(  . 
The source term is calculated for an energy of E = 1.4 GeV and a target for one mean free path 
length in which 63% of the protons will react. This choice is conservative even for the densest targets 
employing lead. It does not take into account the additional neutrons emitted from fission in U-C and 
Th-C targets. 
All shielding walls for the present ISOLDE facility were designed before 1990 with the 
assumption that the average beam intensity on the target is 1013 protons s–1 at an energy of 1 GeV [3]. 
This corresponds to a current of 1.6 μA and a power of 1.6 kW, lower than currently used beam 
parameters. The ISOLDE target area has been shielded with concrete walls and earth shielding against 
areas accessible to the public (the parking spaces and the Route Democrite). The thickness of this 
shielding, resulting from the 1990 estimates, is equivalent to 8 m of earth. The weakest point of the 
shielding is situated at the emergency exit from Bldg. 179 to Route Democrite where ambient dose 
equivalent rates can temporarily exceed the guidance value of 2.5 μSv h–1 at present proton beam 
intensities. 
There is approximately 4 m of earth shielding reinforced by 0.8–1.2 m of iron between the 
target and separator areas. The separator areas are shielded from the experimental area by concrete 
blocks, with a thickness of between one and three metres. Access mazes with a passage width of one 
metre lead from the experimental area to the separator areas. 
For the proposed HIE-ISOLDE beam with a current of 10 μA, the concrete and earth shielding 
around the target area is not sufficiently strong to protect the public: at 10 m distance behind an earth 
shield of 8 m thickness, the expected ambient dose rate is 14 μSv h–1. This exceeds the relevant dose 
rate guidance value by a factor of 6.  
For places in the experimental hall close to the shielding of the separator areas, ambient dose 
rates originating in the target area may reach 30 μSv h-1 (access door to HRS separator area) or 
80 μSv h–1 (at the GHM or GLM beam line). These values exceed the guidance value for not 
permanently occupied places in a supervised radiation area by a factor of up to 8. To this, the dose rate 
from radioactive gases in the vacuum system of the GHM and GLM lines has to be added. 
It is well known that neutrons stream through the ‘Boris tubes’ from the target area into the 
High Voltage Room (HVR) and from there into the experimental hall. The HVR has been equipped 
with an access control system to protect personnel from the significant dose rates prevailing therein 
when uranium or thorium targets are used. Today, the ‘sea’ of neutrons in the experimental hall creates 
an ambient dose rate of 1–2 μSv h–1, measured by radiation monitors on the wall opposite the target 
area. A five-fold increase in beam power would increase the ambient dose rate to 10 μSv h–1 for a 
large fraction of the hall, leaving no margin for the extraction of radioactive beams into the 
experimental area. 
In the controlled separator areas and the HVR, radiation monitors are included in the interlock 
chain of the access control system. Access to the HVR is authorized only when the ambient dose rate 
is lower than 100 μSv h–1. At present beam intensities, the HVR is closed during operations with U-C 
or Th-C targets on either separator.  
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Once the proton beam is turned off, authorized personnel can access the separator areas when 
the ambient dose equivalent rate has dropped significantly below that of a high radiation area 
(2 mSv h–1). Even then, careful planning of work and optimization of radiation exposure are 
mandatory. 
6.3 Radioactive releases from ISOLDE 
The annual dose limit for the public from air releases is 300 μSv for the whole of CERN [4]. In 
Switzerland, no further optimization efforts are required once members of the public are exposed to 
less than 10 μSv a–1 [4, 5]. It is considered good practice at CERN not to exceed this constraint for 
gaseous releases. For comparison, exposure of the public to releases from nuclear power plants in 
Switzerland is between 1 and 5 μSv a–1. In 2004, air releases from TT10 contributed 1.3 μSv to the 
dose to members of the public. This value will increase with the operation of the CNGS beam: a first, 
conservative estimate for 4.5 × 1019 protons on the CNGS target indicates an annual dose of 5.3 μSv. 
The unrestricted running of all experimental facilities on the Meyrin site will call for technical 
solutions to reduce releases and the dose to the public [6]. 
To assess the impact of radioactive releases on the environment and the public, CERN 
implements the approach of estimating the dose to a member of the ‘critical group’ of the public. The 
critical group is defined so that the impact of releases from CERN is maximized (by age, by the place 
of residence or work, and by living habits). If the dose to the critical group does not exceed limits and 
can be shown to be optimized, this will be true for any member of the public. The calculation of the 
dose for a member of the critical group follows the regulations of the competent authorities in the host 
states [7]. 
There are three types of radioactive gaseous releases from ISOLDE: 
– The release of mainly short-lived positron emitters (11C, 13N, 15O) and 7Be. These are produced 
via the spallation reaction by the secondary particle cascade in air resulting from the 1.4 GeV 
proton beam hitting the target. During ISOLDE operations, these gases are emitted continuously 
via the ventilation system. 
– The release of spallation products produced in the ISOLDE targets via the vacuum system of the 
separators and the experimental hall. Tritium and long-lived noble gases (42Ar, 85Kr and 127Xe) 
are not retained in the roughing pump oil of the vacuum system. The gases are stored in 
retention tanks and released after allowing 5 to 12 months for radioactive decay. The retention 
tanks are placed in the ISOLDE target area and are activated, thereby making impossible an 
assessment of the activity contained in them by an external dose rate measurement. The tanks 
are filled to a positive pressure of 2000 hPa, forcing radioactive gases out in case of a leak. 
– The short-term release of 219, 220Rn and its decay products 211, 212Pb and of iodine isotopes during 
the change of U-C and Th-C targets. 
In a nuclear or accelerator facility it is standard practice to release activated air via a filtered and 
monitored stack. Filters retain most aerosols (notably 7Be) and monitors allow quantifying of the 
releases and demonstrate that no limits are exceeded and that the operation of the facility is optimized.  
The ISOLDE stack constructed in 1990 was too short to allow for complete mixing of the 
released air and did not permit reliable absolute release measurements. During the shutdown in 
2004/5, the ISOLDE facility was equipped with a new, longer stack. This stack guarantees a laminar 
flow pattern, the prerequisite for accurate airflow measurement and representative air sampling. 
Reliable figures on the release of short-lived β+ emitters were measured for the first time during 2005. 
They are now being compared to figures predicted from Monte Carlo models. This study aims to 
reproduce release figures from the present ISOLDE facility in order to reliably predict those of HIE-
ISOLDE.  
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The regular measurements show that the short-lived positron emitters account for about 95% of 
the dose to the critical group. At constant beam energy, the production of short-lived β+ emitters from 
spallation in air will increase proportionally to the beam current. In order to cope with increased air 
activation, different options are available: 
– The Faraday cage will be shielded, reducing the track length of the secondary particle cascade in 
air and thus the air activation. 
– The ventilation system will be modified so that the release of the activated air is delayed and a 
part of the activity decays within the target area. 
– A significantly higher stack will be constructed so that the radioactive releases are distributed 
over a larger area and the dose to the critical group becomes smaller. 
For the spallation products from the target, the proportionality to release is mitigated by the 
decay time, but for the long-lived isotopes of noble gases in the retention tanks the final result will 
remain approximately proportional to beam power.  
The impact of the releases from the retention tanks is monitored by streaming the gas through a 
monitor chamber. There is no sampling bias involved. The calculated dose to the critical group of the 
public is negligibly small compared to the short-lived β+ emitters. As long as the retention tanks are 
sufficiently dimensioned to allow storage of radioactive gases for sufficient decay time, releases will 
not represent a problem. With increased production rates of radioactive gases at HIE-ISOLDE, the 
retention tanks should allow external monitoring of the contained activity and they should be 
inherently safe against leakage as, for example, is the case at SPIRAL in GANIL [8]. 
The Rn emanations from target and front-end during target changes must be reduced by an 
appropriate design of new targets and front-ends.  
The consequences of an accidental release of activity during partial or total breakdown of the 
target or front-end vacuum system must be estimated. The protective measures, which have to be 
taken in case of such an event, depend on its probability, which must be estimated with approved 
methods. 
A second pathway of activity releases is water. Rainwater that infiltrates the earth shielding over 
the ISOLDE area may be activated and contaminated and reach the CERN drainage system or the 
ground water. Moisture of unknown origin is regularly observed in the target area. The source of the 
moisture may be in contact with drainage or ground water. Before increasing beam intensity and 
activation levels, a sampling pit should be installed in the vicinity of the ISOLDE target area, 
permitting regular controls of the water activation. Water from the ISOLDE facility is drained towards 
the CERN outlet ‘Car Club’ and discharged into the Nant d’Avril river (CH). 
6.4 Activation in the target area and dose to personnel  
The personal dose limit at CERN is 20 mSv, but for reasons of ensuring the legally required 
optimization of exposure, an action level of 6 mSv in one year has been set. This annual personal dose 
may be exceeded only in exceptional cases with special authorization. Installations at CERN must be 
planned and operated in such a way that a foreseeable excess of the action level under routine 
operating conditions is excluded. 
The secondary particle cascade from the impact of the proton beam on the ISOLDE target 
activates all materials in the target area. Radioactive contamination in and around the front-end 
constitutes an additional radiation source and exposes personnel to a contamination risk.  
At present, the dose equivalent rate in the Faraday cages around the two production targets is 
typically H*(10) ≈ 4–5 mSv h–1. The ambient dose equivalent rate severely restricts ‘hands-on’ 
maintenance of the target and the front-ends. Each intervention is carefully planned and closely 
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monitored by RP personnel. Interventions in the target area are deferred until the end of the annual 
shutdown in order to benefit from radioactive decay. These protective measures result in an annual 
collective dose for the ISOLDE target and separator areas between 15 and 25 man-mSv. Today, 
annual personal doses to a few specialists are in the range 4–6 mSv and therefore very close to the 
action level. The procedure of exchanging a whole front-end, which is required whenever a major 
breakdown occurs, leads to a collective dose of 3 man-mSv. 
Activation and contamination and the dose equivalent rate resulting from them are proportional 
to the number of protons hitting the targets. An increase of the number of protons by a factor of 5 
would result in an ambient dose rate in the vicinity of the front-ends of up to H*(10) ≈ 25 mSv h-1. If 
one simply scales the annual collective dose at HIE-ISOLDE with the same factor of 5, it would 
become comparable with that of the entire SPS.  
It is obviously not possible to plan for a fivefold increase of activation and contamination and to 
continue with the present ‘hands-on’ maintenance procedures, because the action level for annual 
personal dose would be exceeded. Consequently, the front-ends and the targets must be constructed in 
such a way that urgent intervention during the running time of HIE-ISOLDE occur only very 
exceptionally and do not take more than a fraction of minutes. Even towards the end of a shutdown of 
six months duration, ambient dose rates will be so high that maintenance of the whole target front-end 
system must be reduced to the absolute minimum. A front-end change, for example, would lead to a 
collective dose of 15 man-mSv. This implies a redesign of the present target/front-end system, using 
manipulators and robots not only for changing targets but also for maintenance by changing whole 
functional groups of the front-end, when required.  
6.5 Protection against radioactive contamination  
Personnel working at ISOLDE are exposed to external radiation, as everywhere else in designated 
radiation areas at CERN. In addition, they risk being exposed to internal radiation after contamination 
with radioisotopes. The annual dose limit of 20 mSv and the action level of 6 mSv are understood as 
limiting the sum of external and internal exposure.  
The isotopes produced in the ISOLDE targets present a risk of widespread contamination in the 
facility. The vacuum system in the target and separator areas is heavily contaminated. Past the 
switchyards, the contamination becomes gradually weaker, but it cannot be neglected when 
intervening on the vacuum system in the experimental area. Turbo molecular pumps, backed by oil-
filled roughing pumps, maintain the vacuum. Radioactive isotopes contaminate all vacuum pipes and 
the interior of the turbo molecular pumps, making standard maintenance impossible. The volatile 
isotopes are retained in the oil of the roughing pumps, which are installed at various locations in the 
separator areas and the experimental area.  
Depending on the type and concentration of isotopes captured in the oil, the pumps can have a 
significant dose rate (several mSv h-1 on contact). The annually required oil change exposes personnel 
to a high contamination risk. The oil of the pump on the High Resolution Separator (HRS) contains 
32 MBq of α emitters (mainly 208, 209, 210Po). This corresponds to the 16 000-fold of the authorization 
limit of these isotopes as defined in the Radiation Safety Code [4] in accordance with [5] and [9]. 
Extensive protective measures are required for this operation, which must be performed in a 
radioactive work sector of the highest protection Class A [9].  
Finally, the storage, conditioning, and elimination of contaminated waste are more complicated 
and costly than for a comparable volume of activated waste. In the present layout, the HRS separator 
area (not classified as a Class A work sector) houses several roughing pumps for the separators. 
Changes in the layout of the experimental hall may require installation of more vacuum equipment in 
the separator areas. 
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In the separator areas, contamination risk occurs whenever the separators, switchyards and other 
beam line components are opened for maintenance. Owing to the high ambient dose rates during 
operation [H*(10) > 100 mSv h–1], the separator areas are currently classified as primary accelerator 
areas. A physically tight separation between them and the experimental area, avoiding free exchange 
of air-borne contaminants during maintenance or in case of failure, is currently installed. Some control 
equipment is installed in one separator area, exposing its maintenance personnel to external and 
potentially internal radiation. 
While optimization of radiation protection at the present ISOLDE facility would benefit from a 
strict separation of the different areas (target, separator, vacuum and experimental), this will become 
indispensable for the increased contamination risk in HIE-ISOLDE.  
With a contamination of α-emitters at the 100 000-fold of the authorization limit, the standard 
operation of changing the pump oil requires additional protective measures against contamination and 
external radiation for the maintenance personnel. Other personnel must be protected from external and 
internal exposure by the vacuum system. All potentially contaminated vacuum equipment, including 
that from the experimental area, will be grouped in the shielded HRS separator area, which should be 
upgraded to a work sector of Class A.  
The GPS separator area shall be freed of all indispensable equipment, classified as a radioactive 
work sector, and be properly isolated from the experimental area. 
Interventions in areas with high dose rates with the risk of personnel contamination require 
thorough job and dose planning and close supervision by RP personnel. At present, one RP engineer is 
delegated for work at ISOLDE; for difficult interventions he receives backup from another engineer. 
With the RP personnel available, it is generally not possible to work at the same time at two 
workplaces with a high dose rate or the risk of contamination. 
6.6 Construction of an improved target area 
The present ISOLDE target area is not suitable for an operation with three- to five-fold increased 
proton intensity. It has been designed for lower proton beam intensities than used routinely nowadays 
and the safety of operators, researchers, and the environment could not be guaranteed under the 
assumption of a further intensity increase of the proton beam. It has been proposed to dismantle the 
existing target area and to rebuild it, taking into account the lessons learnt from more than 15 years of 
operation as well as integrating passive and active safety features.  
An improved target area would provide for some or all items of the following list:  
– shielding of the targets and front-ends in order to reduce air activation; 
– re-design of the ventilation system with the aim to reduce releases of radioactive air by 
recirculation of air in order to allow radioactive decay of short-lived activation products 
and/or a higher ventilation stack to dilute radioactive releases over a larger area; 
– physical separation of target/front-end and ancillary equipment, such as vacuum system, in 
order to perform maintenance or repair without being exposed to the high dose rate from 
target/front-end; 
– re-design of the target/front-end, allowing for an automated exchange of components with 
manipulators or actuators, reducing the risk of external or internal radiation exposure of 
personnel. 
The plans of an improved target area must be developed with and controlled and approved by 
radiation protection specialists in order to implement the optimization of radiation protection in the 
design. 
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The existing ISOLDE target area needs to be dismantled before a new target area can be 
constructed. Dismantling of a nuclear facility, combining the hazards of high external and internal 
occupational doses from activation and contamination is a delicate proposal. All dismantled equipment 
will have to be controlled for activation and contamination before it can be eliminated in different 
radioactive waste streams. Storage or elimination of the waste has to be planned well before the start 
of the dismantling. 
At CERN, no operative experience for such an undertaking exists and it is proposed to hire a 
specialized contractor for this work. The aim is to declassify the former target area as a conventional 
zone for the duration of the construction work to permit easy access for non-specialized workers.  
The cost of dismantling ISOLDE forms an integral part of the construction cost of HIE-
ISOLDE. 
6.7 Improvements to the experimental area 
The HIE-ISOLDE proposal includes an upgrade to the post-accelerator REX with the aim to accelerate 
the heavy, radioactive ions to an energy of 10 MeV/u. At this energy, intense neutron and gamma 
radiation will emerge from the target and beam dump of the post-accelerator. This requires a complete 
redesign of the shielding of the experimental area at the high-energy end, providing shielding to 
protect the experimental personnel present in Building 170 during experiments.  
It is considerably more difficult to design appropriate shielding for heavy-ion accelerators 
operating in the energy range between the Coulomb barrier and 100 MeV/u than for proton and 
electron accelerators. Only scarce data exist for radiation source terms—essentially the flux of 
secondary particles emitted during an ion–ion collision—and it has been shown that heavy-ion 
interaction models developed for high energies (several 100 MeV/u and above) do not yield reliable 
results in the low-energy range.  
The options for radiation protection in this case are either a conservative design, probably 
overshielding the facility by a large margin, or an in-depth study of neutron- and ionizing-particle 
yields from heavy-ion collisions in the energy range of 10 MeV/u and their implementation as a 
radiation source generator in a Monte Carlo radiation transport code. Both alternatives need additional 
investments in manpower or material.  
The ISOLDE (and HIE-ISOLDE) experimental area is provisionally classified as a work sector 
of Class C [8] although the building does not fulfil the required fire resistance requirements for such 
an area. The activity which can be manipulated in unsealed form in the hall is limited to the 100-fold 
of the authorization limit. This limitation allows experiments to be conducted with reasonable amounts 
of gamma/beta emitters.  Use of short-lived gamma/beta emitters may be limited by the ambient dose 
rate they create in the experimental hall, which is limited to 10 μSv h–1. The availability of unsealed 
alpha-emitters for experiments is seriously limited by their low authorization limit. The benefit from 
an increased production rate will be marginal for experiments relying on collected radioisotopes in 
unsealed form or on short-lived gamma/beta emitters because of the limitations of the experimental 
area.  
To make full use of a more intense ion beam, a shielded and isolated collection bunker must be 
constructed over one of the collection beam lines. It must be equipped like a work sector for unsealed 
sources while preventing the spread of contamination and providing sufficient shielding against the 
intense gamma-radiation from collections of some short-lived isotopes. Only properly packaged 
isotope collections must leave this work sector for destinations in the experimental hall, CERN, or 
collaborating institutes.  
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An overall increase of the risk of external and internal irradiation calls for increased efforts on 
the part of the Radiation Protection Group to monitor, plan, and supervise the scientific work at HIE-
ISOLDE. 
The increased risk potential demands a review of the practice of allowing control of the mass 
separator by CERN users. The round-the-clock presence of operators in the HIE-ISOLDE facility with 
fivefold increased proton current is necessary to guarantee operational safety of the targets, the 
separator, and the experimental area. 
6.8 Production and elimination of radioactive waste 
Radioactive waste is defined as activated or contaminated material or equipment for which no further 
use is foreseen and which can be disposed of. Legislation and regulations in the host states impose 
strict controls over radioactive waste. Only under well-defined technical and administrative conditions 
may radioactive waste be released for reuse, for example as scrap metal. CERN has intermediate 
storage space for radioactive waste. A treatment and conditioning centre is in preparation. There, 
radioactive waste will be prepared for transport to radioactive waste repositories in the host states. It is 
CERN policy that the producer of radioactive waste bears the cost of its elimination [4].  
In contrast to most radioactive waste from other accelerators at CERN, waste from ISOLDE 
generally presents a substantial contamination risk. For the risk of external and internal exposure from 
ISOLDE waste, the remarks in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 apply. At the end of the annual shutdown, about 
30 spent targets are transported to a provisional storage area in the ISR, prior to removal from CERN. 
The storage area for targets has 350 places; at present, it has reached full capacity and cannot be 
extended in the foreseeable future. A project in AB Department and the Safety Commission led to the 
definition of the tools and procedures necessary for characterization, conditioning and transport of the 
targets to the Federal Intermediate Storage Centre (Bundeszwischenlager BZL) at the Paul-Scherrer 
Institute PSI in Villigen, Switzerland. Thirty weakly activated targets will be dismantled and 
preconditioned for disposal as waste during autumn 2006. 
The aim of HIE-ISOLDE is an increased production of radioisotopes for research purposes. 
This will go hand-in-hand with an increase in the production of radioactive waste; in particular, spent 
targets.  
After an increase of proton beam current, the total activity declared as waste will increase 
proportionally. This will have consequences for the tools and procedures for waste conditioning at 
CERN. It will also have an influence on the price of elimination, which is determined by the volume 
of the waste. However, the waste volume cannot be reduced arbitrarily (e.g. by super compaction), 
because of additional limits on total alpha activity per storage container. Two limiting cases can be 
envisaged: 
– The lifetime of the targets is related to the total number of protons received. The present lifetime 
limit is approximately 1019 protons. If the targets remain unaltered, the proton beam increase 
will result in an important increase in the volume of waste (up to a factor of 5), with the same 
activity per target. This amount cannot be handled in the facilities envisaged for the elimination 
project nor by the personnel available in either AB or SC Departments. 
– If the target lifetime is increased, the result could be the storage of targets containing up to five 
times more activity than at present. This will impose longer waiting times before, and improved 
protective measures during, pre-conditioning operations. All installations and procedures 
envisaged in the project for target elimination should be designed with the consequences of a 
beam current increase in mind. 
In either case, a new provisional storage area with the necessary protective measures against 
contamination needs to be provided at CERN for ISOLDE targets. 
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Finally, an increase of proton current will lead to higher activation levels in the whole HIE-
ISOLDE facility. Final dismantling, conditioning and storage of parts or the whole of this facility will 
become more complicated and costly and the necessary funds for this must be foreseen in the CERN 
budget.  
6.9 Summary and conclusions 
The proposed increase of proton beam current in the HIE-ISOLDE facility will make current 
provisions for radiation protection inadequate. The necessary upgrade will require numerous 
modifications to the existing facility, new and improved work procedures, and additional staff in the 
areas of 
– shielding and access 
– optimization of external irradiation  
– optimization of releases into the environment 
– protection against contamination 
– optimization of radiation protection in the experimental areas 
– storage and conditioning of radioactive waste. 
Without defining technical or manpower solutions for all items in this list, the total cost of the 
HIE-ISOLDE project cannot be reliably estimated.  
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